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ABSTRACT: The paper analyses several key features of the chan-
ging landscape of modern welfare states, the major the social 
forces driving this change, and how change is pertinent to the 
future of social work practice. The social forces driving change 
include structural factors such as the demographic transition 
and globalisation of the economy, as well as sociopolitical varia-
bles that involve an understanding of the unanticipated effects 
of social policies and the increased value attributed to the pri-
vate sector. The central characteristics of change include a shift 
in policies away from the protection of labor and toward the 
promotion of work and the increasing use of the private sector 
for the production and delivery of social services. The privatisa-
tion of social welfare and its implications for social work prac-
tice are examined in the light of the challenges in negotiating 
service contracts.
KEYWORDS: privatisation; welfare state; unit-cost analysis; 
enabling state; contracting; social expenditures.
RESUMEN: Este artículo analiza varios aspectos claves de la 
evolución del panorama de los estados de bienestar modernos, 
las principales fuerzas sociales que impulsan este cambio, y 
cómo el cambio es pertinente para el futuro de la práctica del 
Trabajo Social. Las fuerzas sociales que impulsan el cambio son 
factores estructurales tales como la transición demográfica y la 
globalización de la economía, así como variables socio-políticas 
que implican una comprensión de los efectos no previstos de 
las políticas sociales y el aumento del valor atribuido al sector 
privado. Las características centrales del cambio incluyen 
una modificación de las políticas, que se desplazan desde la 
protección del trabajo hacia la promoción del trabajo, y el uso 
cada vez mayor del sector privado en la producción y prestación 
de servicios sociales. La privatización de la seguridad social y sus 
implicaciones para la práctica del trabajo social se examinan a la 
luz de los retos en la negociación de la contratación de servicios.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Since the mid-1980s, a number of important poli-
cy-reforms have shifted responsibilities for social pro-
tection among government, citizens, and the private 
sector, in many if not most of the advanced industri-
alized nations. I have described this development as 
a shift from the welfare state to the enabling state 
(Gilbert, 2004). Others have labeled this trend as a 
move to -- the Schumpeterian Workfare State (Jes-
sop, 1994), the Hollow State (Milward and Provan, 
1993), the Contract State (Eardley, 1997), the Social 
Investment State, (Giddens, 1998; Cantillon, 2011) 
the Active State (Holmqvist, 2010) and the Third Way 
(Giddens, 1998).
These efforts to rebrand the welfare state signify 
that a palpable change has occurred, which is re-
flected in numerous welfare reforms. These reforms 
were initiated to check the mounting costs of social 
benefits and to adapt social policies to the competi-
tive demands of markets in the global economy of 
the 21st century. This paper will analyze the changing 
landscape of modern welfare states examining sev-
eral of the key the social forces driving the change, 
how change is manifest in social welfare policy and 
a few of the issues raised by these modern develop-
ments that are most pertinent to the future of social 
work practice. 
Taking a step back in time we can recall that the pe-
riod from 1960 to roughly 1980 has been referred to 
as the Golden Era of welfare state expansion. Accord-
ing to OECD estimates social welfare expenditures 
nearly doubled from an average 12.3 to 23.3% of the 
GDP among the21 member nations of Organization 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
at that time. That rate of increase, of course, could not 
continue – doubling every 20 years social spending 
would soon reach 100% of the GDP (Gilbert, 2004).
After 1980 the rate of growth as a percent of GDP 
slowed and leveled off to the extent that it was al-
most flat between 1980 and 2007. However if we 
change the metric from spending as a percent of GDP 
to spending on a per capita basis, a different picture 
emerges. That is social spending on a per capita ba-
sis continued to rise. The increased funding did not 
from rising tax rates, as these rates leveled off in the 
1990s. However, from 1994 to 2007 total real growth 
of GDP for the OECD countries averaged 2.6% an-
nually (Gilbert, 2012). Thus, the increased spending 
was fuelled by sustained economic growth (which 
declined after 2007). 
2. FORCES OF CHANGE 
One of the reasons for increased spending is that 
demand for social benefits continued to rise partic-
ularly in response to the aging of the population in 
the OECD countries. Bismark’s state-sponsored social 
security scheme introduced in 1889 was a good deal 
for the state, since workers paid into the system until 
they reached the age of retirement at 65, while life 
expectancy was only 45 years of age. At the end of 
the 19th century who would have expected that by 
2008 men’s life expectancy at birth in Germany would 
have climbed from 45 to 82 years of age. We are now 
at the take off point of a major demographic transi-
tion. In 2010 there were 3 workers contributing to 
the support of one retired person, by 2050 this .33 
ratio will climb to .66 – an average of 1 ½ workers 
supporting one retired person. Spain of course is not 
an exception, in fact in some ways it is leading the de-
mographic transition into aging societies. The growth 
of rate of those 65 and over in Spain will rise from 
17% to 25% between now and 2030, and is estimated 
to reached 34% by 2050.Looked at another way by 
2050, among the OECD countries Spain will have the 
4th highest ratio of the aged population to those in 
the labour force with almost one worker supporting 
one retired citizen. 
This creates a tremendous fiscal pressure on the 
welfare state—and especially on the younger genera-
tion that has to carry the burgeoning costs of an ag-
ing population. Just one example of the intense fiscal 
strain coming our way is phenomenal costs of demen-
tia care for the elderly in the United States. The price 
of this care is expected to more than double from 
$215 billion in 2010 to $511 billion in 2040 (Hurd, 
Martorell, Delavande, Mullen and Langa, 2013).
Aging is not the only force creating pressure for 
change. The demographic landscape of family life has 
changed dramatically. The rise in one-person house-
holds (now 20% of all households in Spain) along 
with the growth in single parent families and female 
labor force participation necessitate additional forms 
of public aid, particularly the provision of daycare for 
young children (OECD, 2011).
But demographic pressures that continue to push 
the demand for social spending upward are not the 
only forces responsible for the changing character 
of the modern welfare state. While social needs are 
expanding, constraints on additional welfare spend-
ing have tightened in response to the pressures of 
the globalization. The rapid mobility of capital to 
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go where production costs are low has heightened 
competitive markets, which intensifies pressures to 
scale back labor rights and welfare benefits. In ad-
dition to the pressures from what can be character-
ized as the large-scale structural forces of demogra-
phy and globalization, there are also socio/political 
forces for change emanating from a shift in norma-
tive views about the consequences of social poli-
cies and the proper relationship between the state 
and the market. Experiences accumulated over the 
decades of welfare state growth have taught us 
much about the unanticipated consequences of so-
cial benefits, particularly their disincentive effects. 
The idea that generous welfare benefits might in-
hibit one’s inclination to work was once viewed as 
heresy by welfare state advocates. In the U.S. they 
claimed that such views were “blaming the victims” 
of market failures. Yet when prudently worded not 
to blame victims, the same idea, that welfare ben-
efits produce “poverty traps” or “enforced depen-
dency” -- has become the received wisdom of the 
late 1990s. In short it has become apparent that 
generous social benefits without conditions can cre-
ate powerful disincentives to work.
Finally, the collapse of the command-economy in 
the Soviet Union has raised capitalism’s stock to re-
cord levels of public approval in the marketplace of 
ideas. This has been accompanied by increasing faith 
in the efficiency and productivity of the market econ-
omy operating through the private sector, the recent 
recession notwithstanding. Thus, at least four lines of 
influence representing complex and multiple forces 
have created pressures for the transformation of the 
welfare state. And what gives these pressures particu-
lar weight is that in different ways they all push in the 
same direction (Table I).
That is, the change moves away from the guiding 
principles of the most progressive welfare states 
which emphasized (1) universal approach to (2) pub-
licly delivered benefits designed to (3) protect labor 
against the vicissitudes of the market and are firmly 
held as (4) social rights --- and toward policies framed 
by a (1) selective approach to (2) private delivery of 
provisions designed to (4) promote labor force par-
ticipation and reinforce (4) individual responsibil-
ity. The transformation is from a welfare state to an 
enabling state, which functions under the guiding 
principle “public support for private responsibility.” 
Within the new framework social welfare policies are 
increasingly designed to enable people to take indi-
vidual responsibility for their financial independence 
and well-being and to enable the private sector to 
expand its sphere of activity in governing the welfare 
market (Table II).
In examining the changing landscape of social wel-
fare policy from this perspective my analysis will focus 
on the dimension of change that is most relevant to 
the future of professional social work practice, that 
is the privatization of social welfare. This analysis will 
trace the several paths along which the movement to-
ward privatization is gaining momentum and some of 
the implications for social work.
Table I. Structural and social-political forces for welfare reform: four lines of influence
 Adapted from Gilbert, N. (2004), table 2.1, p. 44.
DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION
AGING
DIVORCE RATES
EXTRA-MARITAL BIRTHS
FEMALE LABOR-FORCE PARTICIPATION
GLOBALIZATION OF THE ECONOMY
MOBILITY OF CAPITAL TO WHERE PRODUCTION COSTS ARE LOW
MOBILITY OF LABOR TO WHERE BENEFITS ARE HIGH
KNOWLEDGE OF UNANTICIPATED EFFECTS
DISINCENTIVES TO WORK
DEPENDENCY TRAPS
CAPITALISM
RISING FAITH IN MARKET ECONOMY
PRIVATIZATION
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3. PRIVATIZATION
Historically many welfare states have been built 
upon a mix of public and private responsibility for 
both the finance and delivery of social benefits (Gil-
bert and Terrell, 2005). However, over the last two 
decades, for the reasons already mentioned, policy 
makers have come under increasing fiscal pressures 
to introduce measures that might heighten the effi-
ciency and lower the costs of social protection. In re-
sponse to these pressures they have sought ways to 
enlarge the private contribution to the mix of public 
and private responsibility for social protection. This 
is done in hopes of reducing public expenditure and 
increasing quality. In tracing the movement toward 
privatization one finds at least five major avenues 
along which the private sector is engaged in the fi-
nancing, production and delivery of social benefits. 
Two of these approaches seek to promote greater 
private financing through providing tax incentives 
and exercising the regulatory power of government; 
two other approaches aim to increase private in-
volvement in the production and delivery of social 
services through the use of vouchers and contrac-
tual arrangements for outsourcing services; and one 
other approach involves a public/private partnership 
in which private investors put up the initial financing 
to produce and deliver a social service; they are re-
imbursed with a profit if the service is shown to be 
effective in achieving measurable outcomes.
3.1. Promoting Private Financing
• Encouragement of private financing thru public 
tax incentives – public incentives enable private 
financing through measures such tax credits for 
day care for the elderly and other tax benefits 
that partially subsidize private spending on 
health insurance and pension savings. These 
are forms of indirect public spending, which 
are typically calculated under the label of tax 
expenditures. In the United States one half of 
the civilian labor force participates in private 
employment-based pension plans, which re-
ceive favorable tax treatment. Although the 
public sector finances usually more than 90% 
of the costs of social benefits, since 1985 
there has been a noticeable increase in private 
spending as a proportion of the gross social 
expenditures in many OECD countries (Adema 
and Einerhand, 1998). The US has experienced 
the largest increase in voluntary private financ-
ing, which climbed from just below 6% of social 
expenditures in 1985 to 10% in 2009.
• Publicly-mandated private expenditures for so-
cial protection – through legislative mandates 
the public sector can use the regulatory pow-
ers of government to shift some of the costs 
of social protection to private enterprise. In 
the Netherlands, for example, the sickness in-
surance scheme was privatized in 1994, when 
reforms were introduced that required em-
Table II. Shift in Central Tendencies from Welfare to Enabling State
   Adapted from Gilbert, N. (2004), table 2.1, p. 44.
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ployers to assume the responsibility of paying 
at least 70 percent of their workers salaries for 
six weeks of sick leave; in 1996, the period of 
private coverage was extended to 52 weeks 
after which workers could qualify for public 
disability benefits (Geurts, Kompier and Grun-
demann, 2000). Many governments have in-
troduced legislative reforms, which shift some 
portion of individual contributions from public 
pensions to privately managed retirement ac-
counts. Over the last two decades a number of 
countries have moved toward the privatization 
of old age pensions by having individuals invest 
their contributions in private equities. Sweden 
is a case in point – where 14% of the workers 
contributions are invested in private accounts. 
In Chile the citizens’ entire old age pension con-
tribution are privately invested.
3.2. Private Involvement in the Production and Deli-
very of Social Services
• Substituting benefits in the form of cash or 
vouchers for public goods and services – allocat-
ing public benefits in the form of cash or vouch-
ers stimulates private production and delivery of 
social provisions. In Sweden, for example, edu-
cational vouchers provide parents an opportu-
nity to purchase their children’s education from 
private sources. Currently about 12% of Swedish 
students attend schools funded by vouchers. In 
the United States public housing financed and 
produced by the state has given way to the pro-
vision of housing vouchers that allow low in-
come individuals to rent in the private market.
• Purchasing social protection services from pri-
vate agencies – purchase-of service arrange-
ments are sometimes referred to as outsourcing. 
They involve the use of public funds to contract 
with private agencies – both non-profit and 
profit making providers – to produce and deliver 
social services. Since the mid-1990s, there has 
been an avalanche of multi-million-dollar con-
tracts with for profit organizations to provide 
welfare case management, training, job-search 
and placements services, long-term care for the 
elderly, residential services for children, proba-
tion services, health care and many other human 
services. These third-party-purchase-of-service 
arrangements can take several forms such as: 
fixed price, cost plus, and pay for performance 
(extra profit linked to outcomes) contract.
3.3. Public/Private Partnerships (PPP) 
The last approach to privatization involves PPP 
which include: Pay for Success and Social Impact 
Bonds. These are all slightly different iterations of ar-
rangements under which a private party or group of 
private investors initially put up the money to fund a 
human service program. If the privately funded pro-
gram is successful in achieving agreed upon measur-
able outcomes, the government reimburses the pri-
vate parties for their investment including an agreed 
upon level of profit. These arrangements are relatively 
new and untested in the realm of social welfare. Brit-
ain is credited with pioneering this approach with a 
prisoner rehabilitation program funded by a Social 
Impact Bond (SIB) in 2010. In 2012 a program aimed 
at limiting recidivism among prison inmates was 
launched in New York City, which included Goldman 
Sachs among its investors. These arrangements are at-
tracting considerable interest, because they shift the 
large start-up costs and the financial risk of providing 
a social program from the public to the private sector 
(The Economist, February 23, 2013). Private parties 
assume this risk, which accompanies the start-up of 
many private enterprises, -- in the hope of producing 
a successful program for which they will be rewarded 
with a profit.
4. PURCHASE OF SERVICES: CHALLENGES AND ISSUES
Although in recent years privatization has steadily 
expanded along all of these avenues, the use of pub-
lic funds to develop contracts with voluntary and for-
profit agencies for the delivery of social services has 
grown in leaps and bounds.
Between 1979 and 1996 the proportion of all public 
expenditures on personal social services contracted 
out to the private sector in the United Kingdom more 
than tripled, from 11-to-34 percent. Most of this in-
crease reflects a change in the provision of residential 
care which shifted from facilities operated by local au-
thorities to home care under private auspices. Under 
reforms implemented in 1993, commercial firms are 
also moving into domiciliary care, services such as in-
home meals, cleaning, home nursing, and emergency 
alarm systems, under contracts with local public au-
thorities who are “expected to be enablers rather 
than providers” (Johnson, 1995)..
Private for-profit arrangements for social welfare 
are also emerging in Scandinavia. Around the mid-
1980s Swedish counties that operated local health 
care systems began contracting for medical services 
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with doctors in private practice. Within a decade, Hort 
and Cohn (1995) report that “what started out as a 
minor revival of private practice has become a boom.” 
While the public sector provided almost 90 percent 
of the beds in Swedish residential care facilities for 
children and youth in the 1970s, by 1995, close to 
60 percent of these beds had shifted over to private 
institutions (Lundstrom, 2000)..In Norway private for-
profit providers have increased their share of the resi-
dential homes for children and youth. In 1998, they 
accounted for 33.4 percent of the institutions in this 
field of service, a 10 percent gain over their share in 
1995 (Slettebo, 2000). Social care for the elderly is also 
moving toward privatization in the Nordic countries. 
According to Juhani Lehto’s (1999) analysis, “This shift 
from the traditional old age homes to modern service 
homes means in most Nordic countries a shift from 
mostly public providers to a more significant role for 
private non-profit providers”. Germany too has experi-
enced an extraordinary increase in for-profit providers 
in the realm of long term care for the elderly, a field 
of service from which they were virtually excluded 
by law up until the mid-1990s. A 2011 study of social 
services in the European Union by the Employment, 
Social Affairs and Inclusion Directorate General of 
the European Commission reports that Germany and 
the Netherlands rely almost entirely on private sec-
tor provision for all long term care services; the study 
also find that private not-for-profit provision is by far 
the most prominent way of social housing provision 
across old EU Member States, and its importance has 
been growing over the last decade, at the same time 
in many of the 22 countries studied, the relative im-
portance of for-profit employment services was seen 
as likely to increase (European Commission, 2011).
The shifting responsibility for the production and 
delivery of services to the private sector is fueled by 
the belief that private providers are more respon-
sive and efficient than public bureaucracies. Unlike 
public bureaucracies, the private sector benefits 
from the discipline of the market economy wherein 
competition and consumer signals generate effi-
ciency, accountability and innovation which height-
ens the quality and lowers the cost of services. All of 
this boils down to the assumption that where social 
protection is concerned the private sector can do it 
cheaper and better.
Indeed, in the United States 3rd party contracts are 
often less costly than the delivery of social welfare 
services by public agencies. One reason concerns the 
price of union labor, particularly the cost of fringe 
benefits for civil service workers.With the decline in 
union membership among workers in the private sec-
tor over the last several decades, public bureaucra-
cies have emerged as the last stronghold of the labor 
union movement in the United States. From 1985 
to 2010 union membership fell by almost one-third, 
from 18 percent to 11.9 percent of all wage and salary 
workers. All of the decline was in the private sector, 
where union membership slid from 14.4 percent to 
6.9 percent of all wage and salary workers -- a drop 
of about 50 percent. At the same time the percent of 
union membership represented by the public sector 
slightly increased. (Hirsch and Macpherson, 2011). 
The main reason for this holding power is that or-
ganized labor in government is largely in the service 
sector; unlike industrial production, these service jobs 
could not be shipped overseas to be performed at a 
lower cost. Instead of being outsourced globally, they 
are now being outsourced through third-party con-
tracts to the private sector, where social services in 
the U.S. are not unionized.
However, unlike privatization through the use of 
vouchers which promote consumer choice, privatiza-
tion of social services through outsourcing via third-
party contracts by its very nature fails to generate the 
kind of consumer signals that serve to regulate cost 
and quality in the competitive market. Under third-
party contracts, the first-party-buyer, the government 
pays for services it does not directly consume , the sec-
ond-party- the citizen consumes services they do not 
pay for – while the third-party-the for-profit producer 
stands in the highly advantageous position of dealing 
with a buyer who rarely sees what is purchased and a 
consumer who never bears the expense. This is why 
Ackerman (1983) proposed the use of proxy-shopping 
when awarding third-party contracts for service. This 
scheme would requires that in order to qualify for the 
award of a service contract the for-profit service pro-
vider must be able to show that they already serve a 
certain percent of paying customers. These customers 
function as “proxy shoppers” for public funders. That 
is, government uses the behaviour of private con-
sumers to indirectly monitors the cost and quality of 
private services. However, this approach is rarely em-
ployed. In the absence of consumer signals, purchase-
of-service arrangements seek to promote quasi-mar-
ket conditions by awarding service contracts on the 
basis of competitive bidding among potential provid-
ers, including private for-profit organizations. 
In bidding for service contracts the provider orga-
nizations strive to design proposals that offer the re-
ARBOR Vol. 191-771, enero-febrero 2015, a200. ISSN-L: 0210-1963 doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.3989/arbor.2015.771n1002
N
eil Gilbert
7
a200
quired service at the lowest cost. Social work adminis-
trators in the public sector responsible for negotiating 
the service contracts with private providers are look-
ing to obtain the highest quality of service for the low-
est cost. In the course of choosing among competing 
proposals from private providers social work adminis-
trators are increasingly being called upon to perform 
a function that most of them were not required to 
execute 10-to-15 years ago and for which few have 
received adequate professional preparation. Even to-
dayprofessional social work training rarely addresses 
the issues and challenges that arise in the design and 
administration of purchase of service contracts.
The administrative culture of social work in the pub-
lic social services has traditionally placed little empha-
sis on analyzing the cost of public provisions. Indeed, 
there is little incentive to reducing the costs of public 
social services, in part because that might send a mes-
sage suggesting the need for services was declining. 
Few administrators want to see their organizational 
budgets shrink. 
Negotiating third-party purchase of service con-
tracts with the private sector requires a different 
perspective on the cost of services, particularly when 
dealing with profit making providers. Purchase-of-
service negotiations, for example, often require that 
social work administrators have expertise in unit cost 
analysis. Currently many social work administrators in 
the public sector would have a difficult time respond-
ing to the question: How much does it cost to provide 
a unit of service?
When these services are outsourced, it is often nec-
essary to be able to formulate a precise specification 
of what it is that the public agency is buying – the units 
of social service – and how much each of these units 
cost. The arithmetic of unit cost analysis is simple to 
compute – divide the total annual costs (as shown in 
a functional budget) for a service component by the 
units of interest. The essential challenge for social 
work administrators in negotiating purchase of service 
contracts involves specifying the service units of inter-
est. There are at least three basic units of interest: 
• cost per consumer – here the interest is in the 
number of clients served
• cost per the provision delivered – here the 
interest is in the range and quality of service 
functions
• cost per unit of result – here the interest is in 
the outcomes the purchaser hopes to achieve
These calculations depend largely on the scope and 
complexity of the service functions under consider-
ation. Some social welfare functions involve highly 
standardized and uniform procedures as, for example, 
providing immunization for school children. The unit 
of service is discrete and the cost can easily be calcu-
lated either in terms of the number of children served 
or the actual provision -- the number of flu vaccines 
administered. The results can be measured accord-
ing to the extent to which therwere fewer flu illness 
among those receiving the vaccinations. 
However, many social welfare functions are indi-
vidually tailored and multifaceted involving a range of 
services that are variable and comprehensive in na-
ture. Taking a more complex example let us consider 
nursing home placement for the elderly, which, en-
compasses a twenty-four-hour-a-day operation that 
includes food, shelter, care, and therapeutic activities. 
Although the cost per consumer is the easiest to de-
fine and measure, from a purchase of service perspec-
tive it is the least effective, since with complex ser-
vices involving comprehensive care we do not know 
exactly what is being bought for the price. Consider 
the issue of quality in nursing home care as applied 
to the most basic components of this program: daily 
professional supervision, shelter and meals. In regard 
to supervision, a purchase of service contract would 
surely specify the staff/client ratio in the home at all 
times, and probably the level of professional training. 
As for meals, the contract would certainly specify the 
number of meals (three daily per client, plus an after-
noon snack) and basic nutritional standards. And for 
shelter there would be a bed in a room. However, on 
the provision in all of the these areas there is a range 
between minimal and optimal quality. The easily 
measured criteria of staffing ratios, education, days of 
training, number of meals, nutritional standards, and 
beds fail to capture some of the most essential quali-
tative aspects of these provisions: neither maturity 
and warmth of staff (and where they got their educa-
tion) nor taste, texture, and presentations of food en-
ter the calculations. To what extent does the descrip-
tion of shelter specify the amount of personal space 
and privacy? And then there is the more perplexing 
question of what constitute all the relevant compo-
nents: does the contract specify the nitty gritty of how 
often the sheets are changed on beds, how light and 
airy the rooms are, and how warm the thermostat 
is kept? How often do purchase-of-service-contracts 
specify all the relevant service components and the 
appropriate quality standards?
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The problem here is illustrated in a study comparing 
profit-oriented and non-profit service providers, which 
reveals that for-profit providers have a relative advan-
tage when calculated simply on the basis of cost per 
consumer in nursing homes. But what about the qual-
ity of care? Weisbrod and Schlesinger (1986) found 
that for-profit providers had a lower cost per client, 
but also employed fewer staff per patient than non-
profit homes, and that the staff in for-profit facilities 
administered considerably higher dosages of sleeping 
medication to their clients than in non-profit homes.It 
is probably easier and less expensive to care for people 
who are asleep much of the time. What this represents 
in regard to the quality of care is another issue.
The costs for lack of experience and expertise in ne-
gotiating purchase of service contracts is revealed in 
a study of welfare offices in the United State, which 
contracted out employment services under the 1996 
welfare policy reforms. An analysis of four urban areas 
found that for components of service that sounded 
quite similar. The average per person reimbursement 
differed by as much as 130% among the four sites. The 
largest cost differences were found among the sites 
in which the social service administrators tended to 
accept the price set by service providers (Derr, Ander-
son, Trippe and Paschal, 2000). 
In sum, the increasing privatization of the welfare 
state poses a challenge to social work administra-
tors in the public sector as they negotiate contracts 
for service delivery with private agencies. This devel-
opment requires a shift in the prevailing culture of 
public social service administration toward placing 
greater attention on measuring cost and performance 
than has been given to services heretofore delivered 
through the public sector. It is a change that highlights 
the cost-benefit perspective of the private sector. As 
mentioned earlier in the analysis of the move toward 
the enabling state, this shift represents a firm belief in 
the efficiency and productivity of the culture of capi-
talism as it operates through the market economy. 
There is much to recommend greater attentiveness 
in professional social work training to measuring the 
quality, cost, and outcomes of social services. As social 
work administrators develop these skills and adjust to 
the culture of market exchange, however, it is well to 
remember that while this culture has an admonition 
that “the customer is always right,” it also advises “ca-
veat emptor.” “Buyer beware” is a warning especially 
pertinent to third-party purchases in which service 
providers stand between the public agency buyer and 
the citizen consumer. 
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